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INTRODUCTION 
On 1 May 2004 at a historic, if understated, signing ceremony in Dublin the European 
Union (EU) formally recognized the accession to the Union of ten new states. These 
were the Mediterranean ‘micro’ states of Cyprus and Malta, and eight new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe(CEE) –the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – which, for more than fifty years, 
had been cut off from the European integration process by virtue of their geopolitical 
imprisonment behind the Iron Curtain. The eastern enlargement was completed via 
the ‘coda enlargement’, with the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. At that 
point the EU completed its extraordinary and cumulative geographic sweep: the first 
enlargement in 1973 was ‘west’ (UK, Ireland and Denmark), the emphasis in the 
1980s was on the ‘south’ (Spain, Portugal and Greece); in the 1990s the Union 
expanded ‘north’ (Finland, Sweden and Austria).1  
 
The history of European integration has been one of successive and successful 
enlargement rounds; ‘widening’ has proved as potent a force as ‘deepening’ in 
determining how the European Union has evolved as a post-national inter-state and 
supra-state zone of peace and relative prosperity. For more than three decades after 
World War Two, the Cold War stood in the way of the realization of the oft-stated 
ambition to unite ‘east’ and ‘west’ in a single European constellation of states. But 
with the demise of the Soviet Union and the loosening of its post- War grip on its 
Central and Eastern European satellite states in the wake of 1989’s so-called 
‘geopolitical earthquake’, Jean Monnet’s ambition of a European construction 
stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals suddenly seemed possible. Thereafter, 
enlargement quickly made its way to the top of the European Union’s political agenda. 
Two decades later the EU has applied the successful model of ‘Europeanization East’ 
in negotiating with states in the Western Balkans and Turkey, though with less than 
                                                 
1 I do not include the accession of the old East Germany (GDR), which formally acceded to the EU 
after its absorption into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1991. This is considered a purely 
domestic matter. I treat the 2007 ‘coda’ accessions of Bulgaria and Romania as part of the eastern 
enlargement round. 
 1
successful results to date. Thus a process which was instituted in the aftermath of the 
dramatic events that defined the 1989 revolutions and had brought the EU population 
up to 500 million people now sought to consolidate democracy and European 
integration in Europe’s most fragile and contested political space. 
 
This chapter analyzes the European Union’s enlargement process in the two decades 
that followed the ‘annus mirabilis’ of 1989. The 1989 Revolutions opened up the 
possibility of a vast and voluntary framework of economic and political integration 
extending to a genuinely pan-European scale. At the centre of this historic project the 
European Union initially demonstrated great hesitation in response to what Jacques 
Delors termed the ‘acceleration of history’, but gradually found its stride as the 
European Commission assumed responsibility for the practical implementation of, if 
not a utopian ‘Return to Europe’ by ‘Yalta Europe’, then a process whereby gradual 
‘catchup’ could be pursued and adaptation of CEE states to existing legal and 
procedural norms of the European Union could be achieved.  
 
A RATHER HESITANT AND UNGENEROUS RESPONSE 
For the Central and East European states emerging from the shadow of the Soviet 
monolith, the central aspiration was clear: a ‘Return to Europe’; the Europe from 
which, it was frequently asserted, these states had been forcibly separated for over 
four decades. 2  The new CEE governments from the beginning framed their 
endeavours and aspirations with explicit reference to the core values of the European 
integration.3 They sought freedom, prosperity, and a secure place in the international 
community of nation states, and especially within European organizations. Opinion 
polls in the newly independent states pointed to massive popular support for ‘joining 
Europe’.4 For the European Union, however, the aftermath to the peaceful revolutions 
would produce a period of intrinsic questioning, firstly, of what the term ‘European’ 
actually meant, and, more pragmatically, how the Community might respond to the 
CEE states’ stated desire for membership of the club. For the first time, Article 237 of 
                                                 
2 The ‘Return to Europe’ quickly emerged as the central foundational pillar upon which membership 
bids by the CEE states were framed around. The ‘Return’ has been the subject of an exhaustive range 
of academic analysis. See Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the 
Integration/Exclusion Nexus’, Alternatives, Volume 23, 1998, pp. 397-416. 
3 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op.cit., p.433. 
4 See, for example: ‘Poll finds yearning to join Community’, The European, 30 November 1990. 
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the Treaty of Rome, which simply stated that ‘any European State can apply’ for 
membership of the Community, began to be seriously scrutinized.5
 
Even at this early stage, however, a division between EC/EU ‘drivers’ (advocates) and 
‘brakemen’ (obstructionists) was in evidence. On one side British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher unashamedly made the case for an EC commitment to enlarge. The 
question of what motivated her advocacy is usually answered with the assertion that 
she saw a wider Europe as a tool for slowing down the integration process and 
forestalling, if not derailing, any moves to embrace federalism. It was undoubtedly the 
case, however, that she also admired the CEE states for overthrowing communism 
and embracing the dual freedom of the market and the ballot box. At the Aspen 
Institute in Colorado on 5 August 1990 she called for a pan-European ‘Magna 
Carta’.6  Her foreign minister Douglas Hurd was equally supportive, as was John 
Major once he became Prime Minister.7 For some European leaders, however, the 
idea of a speedy enlargement was just too big a leap of either the imagination or the 
purse strings. French President Francois Mitterand, for example, declared in Prague 
that it would be several decades before the CEE states could become members of the 
Community.8 The European Commission for its part took a middle path at this time, 
urging closer links but seeking to deflect the question of membership.9 Later the 
Commission would become a key institutional driver of the process, whilst attending 
to the concerns of member states about one or other area of policy. This division 
between ‘drivers’ and ‘brakemen’ was one that would characterize enlargement 
politics for long periods to come.  
 
The atmosphere was captured in the European Council’s declarations at the 
Strasbourg summit in December 1989 where it specifically acknowledged a ‘special 
                                                 
5 ‘EC dilemma over Eastern Europe’, Guardian, 10 April 1990. 
6 See: ‘Thatcher urges closer EC ties with East bloc nations’, Financial Times, 15 November 1989; 
‘Thatcher seeks commitment on EC entry for Eastern Europe’, Financial Times, 6 August 1990; 
‘Thatcher defies EC over East bloc members’, Independent on Sunday, 12 August 1990. 
7 See, for example: ‘Hurd pushes for EU expansion’, Guardian, 1 May 1995; ‘Major promises to help 
Poland join the twelve’, Independent, 27 May 1992. Major visited Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland between 26 and 28 May 1992 and pledged support for early entry to the Community. 
8 ‘Eastern Europe ‘threatens to destabilise EC’’, Financial Times, 7 November 1990. On Mitterand’s 
position see Jean-Marc Trouille, ‘France, Germany and the Eastwards Expansion of the EU: Towards a 
Common Ostpolitik, pp.50-64. On differences between Thatcher and Mitterand see: ‘Umpteen ways to 
spell Europe’, Independent, 22 September 1990. 
9 ‘Delors frames EC ‘Ostpolitik’’, Independent, 16 November 1989; ‘Brussels urges wider links with 
East bloc’, Financial Times, 2 February 1990. 
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responsibility’ for Central and Eastern Europe and suggested that the Community was 
the only point of reference of significance for the CEE states.10 This was despite the 
fact that the revolutions had caught the Community off guard. For the EU this was as 
much a question of adjusting the cognitive and ideational, as well as the physical and 
geopolitical map of Europe. EU policy, according to Sedelmeier and Wallace, was 
characterized at this time by, amongst other things, hyperactivity, enthusiastic pledges 
of support, and consensus that the EU should play a leading role in the transformation 
process in CEE, even if it was unclear what this might involve.11  
 
It seems instructive, however, that despite the soaring rhetoric from EU leaders, there 
emerged nothing like a Marshall plan for Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed EU 
Funding levels to CEE in the two decades that followed compared very unfavourably 
even with the ‘poorest of the rich’ within the EU – Ireland, Portugal, Greece and 
Spain. The Delors Package of 1988 had significantly expanded the existing 
redistributive arrangements in favour of these countries; similar pressure during the 
Maastricht negotiations yielded the Cohesion Fund, which provided further more 
targeted financial assistance. Cross national comparison of aid figures between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ demonstrates the extent to which EU policy favoured these 
existing members. In 1992, for example, the four poorer, peripheral EU countries 
received fifteen times more per capita aid subvention than did the CEE countries.12 
Ten years later the gap had narrowed but was still very significant. Poland would 
receive €67 per capita, Hungary €49, Slovenia €41, and the Czech Republic €29 in the 
period up to the end of the 2006 financial framework. By contrast, in 2000, Greece 
received €437 per capita, while Ireland got €418, Spain €216 and Portugal €211. 
Further, it was stipulated that aid to individual CEE states was not to exceed the 
imposed ‘absorption capacity’ figure of 4 per cent of GDP. This threshold was set 
much lower than had been the case in previous enlargement rounds. It is little wonder 
that the CEE states gazed wistfully at the Cohesion states and their very generous 
levels of EU support.13  
 
                                                 
10 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Strasbourg European Council, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, EC 12-1989. 
11 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op.cit., p.432. 
12 Hubert Leipold, ‘The Eastwards Enlargement of the European Union: Opportunities and Obstacles’, 
Aussen Politik, Volume 46, Number 2,1995, p.131. 
13 The figures are cited by Heather Grabbe, op.cit. 
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The point is further put in perspective when one considers that Ireland, although 
already by 2000 one of the richest states in the Union, was still in receipt of almost six 
times more aid than was envisaged for Poland. Between 1989 and 1999 regional aid 
to Ireland amounted to approximately 3 per cent of GDP per annum; in some years 
the receipts amounted to in excess of 5 per cent of GDP, a supranational transfer of 
wealth unprecedented in European history.14 To further emphasize the lack of support 
offered CEE, a comparison can be offered with German transfers to its Eastern 
Laender after unification: in 1993, these amounted to $5900 per capita. 15  In the 
decade after unification, net fiscal transfers from the German Federal Government to 
the former East Germany amounted to some 1.2 trillion DM. This figure amounted to 
ten times what the EU allocated in aid to all the CEE candidate countries put together 
in the run up to accession in 2004. The impression of the CEE countries remaining the 
poor relations is difficult to refute and is reflected in the opinion of some that the 
Oder-Neisse line quickly transmuted into a new and lasting economic divide, 
separating Europe’s haves and have-nots.16  
 
Iver T. Berend showed that had the Marshall Plan been emulated for Central and 
Eastern Europe, even on a limited basis, with, for example, a Western contribution of 
only one half of one per cent of GDP, this would have yielded up to $100 billion 
annually for reconstruction and transition in Central and Eastern Europe. If one shifts 
the focus to EU aid alone, in 2004 the combined EU15 GDP amounted to over €9 
trillion. A Marshall-style financial aid programme would have delivered 
approximately €90 billion per year to CEE. Even a contribution of one half of one per 
cent of EU GDP would have yielded a figure of €45 billion annually for a limited 
period. The total package of financial aid, however, amounted to only €40.8 billion 
(2004 to 2006). But given that the new member states would also contribute to the 
budget something approaching €15 billion, the net figure was reduced to about €25 
billion. The Commission thus suggested a net cost for ten countries over three years 
of just €10.3 billion per annum, which amounted to just one-thousandth of EU GDP.17 
This was by any estimation a pale imitation of the Marshall Plan. 
                                                 
14 John O’Brennan,  
15 See: Economist, 17 June 1995. 
16 Arnuf Baring, Germany’s New Position in Eastern Europe: Problems and Perspectives, (Oxford: 
Berg, 1996), p.68. 
17 Peter Ludlow, op.cit., p.299.  
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 This hesitant and rather ungenerous response to CEE on the EU’s part was predicated 
on a number of factors. Firstly, the Union’s self-absorption for most of the twenty 
years after 1989 stands out. Perry Andersen argues that, paradoxically, the demise of 
Communism acted to the disadvantage of the CEE associated countries because it 
triggered an intensification of Western European integration efforts.18 Indeed in this 
interpretation, Maastricht is singularly identified as the quid-pro-quo for German 
Unification; the assurance of a united Germany’s renewed commitment to its EU 
partners and the European integration system. Suspicion of German hegemonic or 
aggrandizing intent was not slow in materializing. Eastward enlargement, it was 
widely thought, would benefit Germany economically and geopolitically much more 
than any other EU member state. Thus, fear of the putative German giant caused some 
of the present member states to steer enlargement along the ‘slow lane’. The gradual 
realization, on the part of EU leaders, of the daunting institutional and policy 
implications of enlargement also encouraged caution and inertia. Analysis of the 
micro implications of enlargement was provided by a wide range of commentators 
and by the European Commission and European Parliament. 19  The shadow of 
enlargement thus hovered over every major internal EU debate from the early 1990s 
onwards.  
 
For the CEE states this meant that, at precisely the moment of their return to the 
mainstream European inter-state arena, they were effectively locked out of the central 
political processes that would shape the future Europe. Their absence from the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam constitutional negotiations, for example, was striking.20 
Exclusively the incumbent members would determine the shape of the new European 
compact without any input from the Central and Eastern European states. Throughout 
that period growing concern about the direction of EU policy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe manifested itself on a regular basis. Indeed, a European Commission 
official was quoted as saying: ‘The level of seriousness about enlargement is not 
                                                 
18 See Independent, 29 January 1996.  
19 See, for example, Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph E. Francois, and Ricardo Portes, ‘The Costs and 
Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: the Impact on the EU and Central Europe’, Economic Policy, Volume 
24, April 1997; Karen Hendersen (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the 
European Union, (London: University of London Press, 1999). 
20 ‘Absent friends frozen out of unity talks’, Guardian, 7 December 1991; ‘Eastern Europe keeps half 
an eye on the EC’, Financial Times, 12 December 1991. 
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minimal, it simply does not exist’.21 The initial euphoria of 1989 then soon gave way 
to muted resignation as the EU found that its response to the emerging democracies 
became increasingly affected by the economic and political vicissitudes of both EU 
and global politics.  
 
A second problem arose from the impact of a Europe-wide recession on the member 
states, and – later - the deflationary policies employed in many countries in order to 
conform to the EMU convergence criteria. Budget deficits, increased unemployment 
and attendant social strain resulted in the subordination of enlargement to domestic 
policy issues in many member states throughout the mid 1990s. Sclerotic growth and 
a fiscal climate governed by relative austerity rendered it more difficult to respond to 
the extraordinary economic and social ‘gaps’ in CEE with imagination and generosity. 
One might also at this point cite the existential fears which existed in some member 
states about the emergent competitive threat from CEE in important industries such as 
motor manufacturing and electronics: notions of solidarity and ‘we-ness’ often gave 
way to narrowly-based EU sectoral interests, intent on maintaining competitive 
advantage. 
 
A third issue emerged in the logistical problems encountered by the Commission in its 
efforts to coordinate aid programmes for the CEE states. Dependent on outside 
expertise, and handicapped by a severe lack of resources, the Commission soon ran 
into implementation difficulties and voluble criticism. Sedelmeier and Wallace assert 
that the EU found it easier to devise ad hoc policy than to design a more balanced and 
rounded approach. This was a common charge, though mostly levelled with the 
benefit of hindsight and with little regard to the problems relating to speed, timing, 
and staff and expertise shortages. 22  In addition rivalries within the Commission 
(principally between DG I and DG’s III (industry) and VI (agriculture) and within 
national administrations (typically foreign ministries against sectoral ministries) 
contributed to the problems of coordination and implementation in the early stages of 
the enlargement process. Sedelmeir and Wallace presented this as a ‘macro/meso’ 
divide among policy makers, with macro policy makers (usually located within the 
                                                 
21 Quoted by Lionel Barber, Financial Times, 16 November 1995.  
22  Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op.cit., p.435. See also Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Sectoral 
Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access, and Alliances in a Composite Polity’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Volume 9, No.4, August, pp. 627-34. 
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foreign ministries of national administrations) typically taking the long term view and 
being more sympathetic to the CEE concerns while meso policy makers (usually to be 
found in sectoral ministries) engaged in narrowly-constituted short-termism and were 
very susceptible to the claims of special interests in their own domestic economic 
spheres. Even within DG I there was significant division along similar lines.23 Thus at 
both the horizontal and vertical levels within the EU, opposition to, or at least 
different forms of obstructionism towards, enlargement, came over time to 
characterize a process that had been instituted with such utopian fanfare in 1990.  
 
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENLARGEMENT AND THE 
ENLARGEMENT ‘CANON’ WITHIN EU STUDIES 
If the 1989 Revolutions launched a continental scale institutional re-engineering of 
Europe, it seems clear that eastern enlargement also catalyzed a renaissance in 
scholarship on and interest in EU external affairs. In conjunction with a deepening of 
intra-EU cooperation in the external relations field heralded by the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the geopolitical re-
calibration set in train by 1989 provided a dynamic of its own within the world of 
scholarship: from Fukuyama’s End of History thesis to Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations, to declarations of the return of Realism by John Mearsheimer and others, 
almost every geopolitical question of the 1990s revolved around security re-
alignments within and beyond the EU and the ‘new Europe’; enlargement studies 
developed an identity of its own within the world of scholarship whilst also drawing 
upon and adding new dimensions to existing literatures within International Relations 
(IR) and the ever-more diverse smorgasbord that was European Integration studies. 
This section assesses the literature on enlargement and what each element contributed 
both to this ‘enlargement canon’ and what one might call the (looser and more 
recognizable) political history of the enlarged and enlarging Europe. We can divide 
this political history into three separate sections: how the external impacted on the 
internal (institutional and policy domain within the EU); the economic dimension of 
enlargement, and the geopolitical phenomena associated with expansion. Each section 
is explored via the literature which emerged to help define and shape the ‘enlargement 
canon’. Finally, a specifically theoretical literature is analyzed from the perspective of 
                                                 
23 Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, op.cit., p.439. 
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rational institutionalism on the one hand and social constructivist and normative 
understandings of enlargement on the other. The spirited debate between these two 
‘camps’ to some extent reflected polarized conceptions of what kind of EU emerged 
from the 1989 revolutions and the fundamental dynamics of the unfolding 
continental-scale framework of institutional and policy interaction taking shape under 
the aegis of Brussels. 
 
The external and the internal 
In the first place we can trace the internal European Union debates on eastern 
enlargement and thus both the political history of the accession process and the 
institutional division of labour as it played out in Brussels and in member state 
capitals. From the beginning of the period of internal debate, which we can identify as 
coinciding with the European Council meeting at Copenhagen in June 1993, which 
produced a (rather loose and ambiguous) set of membership criteria for candidate 
states to work towards as they engaged in different degrees of reform of their 
domestic economic and political structures, the serious nature of the institutional and 
policy challenges facing the Union was underlined by both official documentation and 
scholarly analysis that clearly marked out this enlargement as historically unique in 
scope and scale. Two types of approach in particular stand out: those that focused on 
the complex re-calibration of EU institutions which would have to accompany a ‘big 
bang’ accession process, and the myriad policy challenges thrown up by expansion, 
most especially those of agriculture and regional funding (the policy areas which 
accounted for approximately 85 per cent of EU spending). Such studies revolved 
largely around in depth empirical work on institutional and policy change and also 
sought to outline the gradual development of EU relations with the CEE states. Of 
particular importance here are the contributions of EU ‘insiders’ such as Graham 
Avery, Fraser Cameron, Anna Michalski and Peter Ludlow, all of whom worked in 
different periods for the European Commission, and whose work contains valuable 
accounts of the internal EU deliberation on enlargement and especially the inter-
institutional context in which the actors, interests and identities at play within the 
regime of enlargement politics was played out. 24 These works allow us to peer into 
                                                 
24 Graham Avery, ‘The Enlargement Negotiations’ in Fraser Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe: 
Integration and Enlargement, pp.35-62; Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, Enlarging the European 
Union, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998); Michael J. Baun, A Wider Europe: The Process 
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the EU structure of power and how it responded to and itself was changed by the great 
challenges of enlargement to the east. The clash between ‘drivers’ and ‘brakemen’ 
emerges as a consistent theme of insider accounts and can be traced right up to (and 
even beyond) the successful conclusion of negotiations at Copenhagen in December 
2002. 
 
The enlargement of such a complex and multifaceted international entity necessarily 
entails an important internal institutional dimension. Enlargement both arises out of 
specific forms of institutionalized cooperation and subsequently produces a 
reconfiguration of those institutionalized norms, practices and structures: thus the 
myriad (and frequently contested) modes of ‘internalization’ of the external by 
insiders constitute an important locus of analysis for scholars of enlargement politics. 
Enlargement is a policy domain which involves each of the main EU institutions in a 
distinctive way. This was clearly reflected in the institutional division of labour laid 
down in the treaties, which would govern CEE accession decisions: 
 
Any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may 
apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the 
Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and 
after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an 
absolute majority of its component members. 
 
The conditions of admission and the adjustment to the treaties on which the 
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement 
shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements.25
 
                                                                                                                                            
and Politics of European Union Enlargement, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); 
Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe: the European Councils on Brussels and Copenhagen 
2002, European Council Commentary Volume 2, Number 1, (Brussels: EuroComment, 2004); George 
Vassiliou, (Ed.), The Accession Story: the EU from 15 to 25, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007);. 
25 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 6 (1) (Ex Article F) effectively codified 
the Copenhagen criteria for membership of the Union. It reads: ‘The Union is founded on the principles 
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States’.  
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Thus the formal hierarchy of power with respect to an enlargement decision appears 
very clear: the Council, consisting of representatives of the member state governments, 
takes the decision, having consulted the Commission. The decision seems then to be 
purely a matter for the member states operating in an intergovernmental mode. But a 
more substantive contextual analysis of Article 49, informed by an understanding of 
how the EU system works (and has evolved) in practice, reveals a more complicated 
and nuanced picture of the decision-making process. The European Commission 
effectively acts as principal interlocutor with the candidate states and has an important 
influence on both the content and shape of the process, as it develops. The treaty 
articles also bestow an important role on the European Parliament, in that no 
accession decision can be taken without the Parliament’s assent.26 And, in the final 
instance, the outcome of the process rests on the ratification procedures in both the 
acceding states and the member states. All of this suggests that it is quite wrong to 
identify the Council as the only EU actor that counts in the process.  
 
The eastern enlargement is particularly noteworthy for the way in which the European 
Commission carved out a distinct institutional and political role for itself within 
enlargement politics. The Commission’s influence flowed principally from two 
sources. The first was its formal power to initiate policy proposals, which helped it to 
set and shape the enlargement policy agenda. Although, as in the general integration 
framework, as a rational actor, it sought to anticipate, incorporate and adjust for the 
specific concerns of member states (and increasingly the EP), it often found itself to 
be (almost by default) the sole policy entrepreneur and thus the most active, visible 
and best placed EU institutional actor within the enlargement process. It is important 
to understand that much of this particular dynamic evolved out of the early response 
by the EU to events in CEE in the early 1990s. Facing the challenge of managing 
relations with the new democracies and the imperative of moving quickly and 
decisively to embed the democratic transitions taking place in CEE, the EU very 
quickly became dependent on the Commission for both political leadership and policy 
advice. It was the Commission which took responsibility for managing the initial aid 
programmes for CEE such as PHARE and SAPARD, produced the Opinions on the 
ability of the candidate states to meet the criteria for membership and oversaw the 
                                                 
26 This procedure is now known as ‘Consent’ after changes introduced through the Lisbon Treaty, 
enacted in December 2009. 
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screening process, that is, the analysis of efforts by candidate states to transpose and 
implement the acquis communautaire into their bodies of domestic law. Even in the 
latter stage of negotiations in 2001-02, where the member states were (in theory) in 
the ascendancy and the Presidency played a crucial role, the Commission continued to 
cajole, deliberate, and persuade both insiders and outsiders of the merits of its 
‘community-centred’ enlargement strategy and thus to put aside narrow partisan 
interests.  
 
The experience of eastern enlargement also demonstrates that where formal 
prerogatives were absent the Commission used what developed as ‘customary 
enlargement practice’ to carve out a substantive informal agenda setting role for itself 
outside of the formal treaty structure, framing policy problems and urging consensus 
where difficulties arose. Individual commissioners such as Gunter Verheugen and 
Ollie Rehn very often acted as political entrepreneurs, and proved themselves both 
proactive and integral to enlargement outcomes. In its policy documents and public 
pronouncements the Commission frequently resorted to a specific normative 
enlargement discourse, deploying a series of moral arguments in its efforts to 
accelerate the negotiation process. The Regular Reports on candidate state progress, 
for example, just as they stressed the importance of enlargement as a vehicle for 
securing EU values across Europe, also presented eastern enlargement as one with ‘an 
unprecedented moral dimension’. The speeches of Romano Prodi and Günter 
Verheugen in particular were studded with references to Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Poland as ‘an integral part of Europe’, or part of the ‘extended family of 
European nations’.27 Jacques Delors similarly, in retrospect, presented enlargement as 
an act of historical and moral justice:  
 
Active peace is not the “peace of cemeteries” we experienced during the Cold 
War. We must not forget that we west Europeans found ourselves on the right 
side of the line drawn by the Yalta agreement and that our East European 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Prodi’s 2001 speech to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The title is indicative 
of the ‘drivers’ inclusive approach – ‘Bringing the Family Together’. Romano Prodi, ‘Bringing the 
Family Together’, Speech to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Speech/01/158, Budapest, 4 April 
2001. 
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relatives were less fortunate. I consider we have a debt toward them from a 
historical point of view.28
 
At the broader institutional level the Commission, through its capacity building and 
compliance functions within the process, was (and remains) the EU institutional actor 
closest to the candidate states throughout the process, providing advice and pragmatic 
engagement, urging broader and deeper transposition (and internalization) of EU 
norms, and actively socializing candidate state public representatives into EU practice. 
Viewed by the candidate states as ever-demanding and frequently unreasonable in its 
insistence on full and unconditional implementation of the acquis, viewed by the 
member states as frequently too accommodating of candidate state preferences, the 
Commission often threaded a thin line between bureaucratic process manager and 
political entrepreneur, between agent of the member states and separately constituted 
political actor. And although it might seem decidedly unfashionable to describe what 
is sometimes misidentified as the ‘Brussels Bureaucracy’ as the unsung hero of the 
enlargement process, much of the evidence suggests that this is exactly how the 
Commission emerges from eastern enlargement. In its engagement with the candidate 
states, imaginative framing of policy proposals within the EU, and not inconsiderable 
diplomatic skill in pushing the sometimes reluctant member states toward completion 
of the negotiations, the Commission performed the type of role which, if indeed 
unglamorous and hidden from the European public, was  integral to consolidating the 
gains of the 1989 revolutions. It is thus quite inarguable that the Commission acted as 
the primary internal EU ‘driver’ or ‘motor’ of the eastern enlargement process.  
 
The Economic Dimension of Enlargement 
Given the scale of the devastated economic landscape in the east, and the nature of the 
restructuring of the industrial base which took shape in CEE after 1989, the economic 
dimension of the enlargement process took on a highly significant importance for both 
insiders and outsiders. EU member states were fearful of new competitive threats 
emerging from the ashes of the moribund socialist economies, whilst in CEE the most 
common complaints related to EU obstructionism on market access and difficulties in 
adopting costly single market legislation. The obvious weaknesses of post communist 
                                                 
28 Jacques Delors, op.cit. 
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legal systems and public administration rendered doubtful the capacity of many CEE 
states to compete effectively in the single market. Thus a primary focus of the 
Commission as accession drew closer was that of market oriented juridical and 
administrative transposition of EU law and compliance with EU rules. 
 
Whilst some approaches to the economic dimension of eastern enlargement focused 
on the nature of productivity growth and capital and investment flows into Central 
and Eastern Europe, the prospect of enlargement also compelled the EU to focus on 
extending its existing framework of regional and structural funding whilst also 
reforming key policy areas such as agriculture.29 Perhaps the most influential of the 
academic contributions was that of Alan Mayhew whose Recreating Europe analysed 
the political economy of eastern enlargement and bridged the divide between 
academic analysis and policy-making and between inside and outside perspectives.30 
Similarly, Richard E. Baldwin’s work sought to combine analysis of the costs and 
benefits of enlargement for both insiders and outsiders 31  
 
Enlargement promised gains for both incumbents and applicants, though considerably 
more for the latter than the former, and spread very unevenly amongst the member 
states. The scale of the economic challenge was also evident in the fact that the level 
of economic development of the CEE countries, measured by GDP per capita was not 
just significantly below that of existing members, but in a majority of cases, much 
lower than any previously successful entrant to the EU. Income per head in 2002 
ranged from 60 per cent in the case of Slovenia to as low as 30 per cent for Poland 
and 25 per cent for Bulgaria and Romania. 32  Enlargement clearly implied a re-
balancing of EU regional policy in favour of the poorer, less developed and 
infrastructurally deficient states to the east: subvention would have to be found to 
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underpin new motorways, airports, ports and sewage systems, whilst high levels of 
unemployment, at least outside most capital cities, compelled investment in human 
resources and re-training. Although it is now clear that the new member states have 
received substantially less than did earlier, poorer entrants such as Ireland and Greece, 
what is remarkable is that disputes about redistribution did not come to dominate the 
enlargement agenda. CEE leaders seemed to understand that economic renewal would 
come mainly from within and from adaptation to the established market system and 
not from the EU as a rich external benefactor. And indeed trade between the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ member states tripled in the decade prior to 2008, from around €150 billion to 
€450 billion.33
 
By far the most important policy area to come under scrutiny, however, was that of 
agriculture, which despite the professed urgency which often accompanied official 
pronouncements on the need for reform of the CAP, managed to survive more or less 
intact (and thus unreformed), until very late in the negotiation process. The fear of 
extending the financial largesse of the CAP to Poland and Romania, to identify those 
candidate states most dependent on agriculture, motivated a stream of policy 
proposals centred on reform and sustainable adaptation on both sides.34 And whilst 
the new member states in CEE would not benefit nearly to the same extent from CAP 
as earlier entrants such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, the eventual regime that would 
emerge at least provided a much more secure footing for transition in the countryside 
than might otherwise have been available. 35  But even after securing the partial 
extension of CAP after 2004, the new eastern members could not avert the familiar 
‘flight from the land’ which had so characterised the experience of both earlier 
entrants and established producer countries alike.  
 
The Geopolitical Dimension of enlargement 
Enlargement both developed out of and encouraged new thinking about key 
geopolitical and security considerations, sometimes linked to the parallel process of 
NATO expansion, and also complicated the search for consensus on the EU’s 
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emerging security and defence policies.36 From the outset geopolitical issues featured 
strongly in the calculus of EU leaders. Enlargement increased both the size of the EU 
population and the territory it covers by a significant degree (about one third in each 
case). In terms of area that meant the European Union now stretched from the Atlantic 
in the west to within miles of St. Petersburg in the east, and after 2007, to the Black 
Sea coast in the south east. Enlargement thus brought with it new dangers and new 
geopolitical opportunities for the Union. Some saw it as a vehicle for turning the EU 
into a global geopolitical power that would match the EU’s power in the economic 
realm. But other commentators feared the messy entanglements that might arise from 
moving EU borders to an eastern geopolitical space which remained contested and 
fragile, and where border demarcations were both physically porus and, potentially, 
catalysts of inter-ethnic conflict. Enlargement gradually threw open the question of 
where Europe’s eastern and south eastern borders light lie. Although Russia was 
much more suspicious of NATO enlargement eastward, in time the EU also got drawn 
into a more tense relationship with Russia, mainly because of the tensions provoked 
by new borders and disputes such as that over Kaliningrad. While eastern enlargement 
may have been a vehicle for containing both Russian power and the consequences of 
Russian state weakness, EU policy toward Russia was both assertive and conciliatory.  
 
Eastern enlargement helped stabilize and then normalize inter-state relations in 
Eastern Europe and ensure a peaceful transition from communism to European 
integration. Security considerations were especially important in both moving the 
enlargement process forward at critical junctures and also changing the contours of 
enlargement in specific ways. The Kosovo war of 1999 especially stood out in this 
regard. Kosovo was a warning shot to the EU about the dangers of excluding the 
Balkans from the integration process. This not only accelerated the eastern 
enlargement process, it also produced a much more sure-footed and concrete EU 
model for the integration of the Balkans. The same political-institutional mix 
employed for eastern enlargement began to be deployed in South East Europe also, 
thus ensuring that analysis of EU relations with the states of the Western Balkans and 
Turkey proceeded from a starting point of ‘learning lessons from’ the eastern 
                                                 
36 John O’Brennan, ‘Bringing Geopolitics back in: Exploring the Security Dimension of the 2004 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 19, 
I, March 2006, pp.155-169;  
 16
enlargement. 37  Geopolitical factors certainly counted in the timing and nature of 
enlargement policy-making, even if they were frequently superseded by economic and 
normative considerations on the part of the EU.  
 
Theoretical approaches to Enlargement 
In the years after 1989, as the integration of Europe gathered pace, a theoretical 
literature began to develop; this drew on two juxtaposed bodies of thought from the 
sub-discipline of International Relations (IR), and conceptualized eastern enlargement 
from those perspectives. Rationalist scholars argued that enlargement proceeded from 
a materialist and utilitarian understanding on the part of both internal and external 
actors; the main motivation of the key actors lay in concerns about securing both 
economic and security benefits from expansion. In contrast, scholars approaching the 
phenomenon from a normative perspective argue that enlargement emerged out of 
common and shared norms, principles and understandings of what the European 
integration process represented and the natural right of all European states to 
participate in the unique institutional and policy-making structures as full and equal 
members. Where rationalist scholars highlighted so-called ‘logics of consequentiality’ 
which allegedly governed enlargement decision-making, sociologically-grounded 
scholars instead argued for ‘logics of appropriateness’ as the key cognitive templates 
which informed and guided the behaviour of decision-makers. This disciplinary clash 
was both a product of and contributed significantly to the rationalist/constructivist 
divide which had come to define a large part of the academic conversation on EU 
public policy-making. 
 
On one side of the theoretical divide a rationalist literature grew up around the study 
of the constitutional and institutional dimensions of the enlargement process. The 
study of national decision-making and supranational bargaining which accompanied 
specific aspects of the eastern enlargement framework drew attention to a part of the 
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process which was at least as important as the (largely asymmetric) inside-outside 
bargaining between the EU and the candidate states.38 In particular, scholars sought to 
determine the likely impact of enlargement on EU decision-making by focusing on 
changes to the rules governing the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) within 
the Council and the general costs of institutional adaptation. Perhaps the most 
important theoretical template for analyzing enlargement from a rationalist 
perspective was Andrew Moravscik’s The Choice for Europe, which offered a view of 
the European integration process as one characterized by intergovernmental 
bargaining and dominated by the powerful economic interests of the larger member 
states. The Choice for Europe had very little to say about eastern enlargement (or 
indeed any previous enlargement of the EU), but in other contributions Moravscik 
applied his liberal intergovernmentalist framework to argue that enlargement did not 
fundamentally re-order any of the important features of the integration process and 
that the EU bargaining which accompanied the enlargement process resulted in 
typical compromises which protected the structural interests of the larger member 
states whilst buying off potential losers with compensatory ‘side payments’.39
 
On the other side of the theoretical divide constructivist scholars highlighted the 
importance of ideas, identity, and social interaction within the eastern enlargement 
process. This literature, although itself increasingly diverse, sought to highlight the 
normative importance of different features of the process, and especially the 
cumulative and net effects of CEE exposure to EU norms and values in multiple and 
cross-cutting arenas of mutual activity. 40  One school of thought focused on EU 
motivations for enlargement deriving from a sense of historical obligation, such as 
‘uniting Europe’, or ‘undoing the historical injury wrought on the CEE states at 
Yalta’. Other approaches analyzed eastern enlargement from different identity 
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perspectives and sought to determine whether enlargement practice produced identity 
transformation.41  
 
This debate revolved in particular on the role and impact of the EU’s conditionality 
regime on candidate states. The effort to bridge the divide between the rationalist and 
normative camps was led by Swiss scholar Frank Schimmelfennig. His work became 
by far the most cited work on enlargement; and sought to contribute to existing 
debates on the nature of European integration and the EU as an external actor. 42 As 
the enlargement process developed and measurement of EU ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ 
became possible, a growing number of scholars sought to analyze the use of various 
types of conditionality, and especially political conditionality, by the EU, as scholars 
sought to determine the extent to which Central and Eastern Europe was becoming 
(alternatively) ‘Europeanized’, ‘modernized’, and ‘democratized’ through the 
enlargement process. 43  And under what conditions could the EU really make a 
difference in penetrating the domestic realm of governance in candidate states?44 The 
conditionality debate juxtaposed those who saw EU policy as efficient and 
transformative against more sceptical voices which argued for the minimal impact of 
conditionality on the domestic politics of candidate states. In a particularly nuanced 
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and widely-read study Milada Ana Vachudova emphasised the promise of 
membership as the key facilitator of real adaptation to EU norms, and for rule-
following in advance of accession.45 Similarly, in a systematic study of international 
networks, Beate Sissenich argued that the transposition of EU rules through 
enlargement was to say the least very uneven. Rule transfer depended on many factors 
including underlying patterns of cultural accommodation and the congruence of local 
interests with EU norms. Sissenich especially identified the domestic arena in 
candidate states where EU rules would sometimes be contested quite robustly and 
where the capacity to implement the EU acquis was frequently lacking.46 EU Rule 
transfer was also analyzed under the rubric of existing literatures on democratization 
and democratic transitions. The EU’s role as an ‘agent of democratization’ in its 
immediate neighbourhood and beyond provoked important arguments about the 
nature of EU democracy promotion and its effects in candidate states and (post 
eastern enlargement) in neighbouring states.47 In particular this theoretical analysis 
drew on the existing EU-centred ‘Europeanization’ literature; and would produce an 
important mutation of this strain of theory in a specific approach termed 
‘Europeanization East’. Thus the empirical work on ‘Europeanization’ patterns was 
accompanied by much more sustained theoretical attempts to measure and analyze the 
exact degrees of ‘Europeanization’ to be found within the enlargement process.48
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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Enlargement, as Desmond Dinan reminds us ‘has been a central and quasi-permanent 
element in the EU’s history’.49 The first set of new members (UK, Denmark and 
Ireland) had hardly been assimilated when the second set (Greece, Spain and 
Portugal) applied to join. Similarly, the Community was still assimilating the second 
set when the third set of ultimately successful applicants (Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden) requested accession. There followed the absorption of the old GDR, and, in 
the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, after a protracted period of sometimes very 
heated negotiations, the ‘Return to Europe’ of the ten CEE states to emerge from the 
annus mirabilis of peaceful transition. 
 
It seems clear in retrospect that from early on in the emerging dispensation 
enlargement cast a clear and discernible shadow over every important aspect of 
internal and external EU activity. Thus even if the eastern enlargement differed 
significantly from previous rounds in terms of scale and diversity, academic literature 
and political commentary continued to focus on the established preoccupation with 
widening and deepening. The questions related to the ‘finalité’ of integration were of 
course intimately connected with the EU’s ambitions for further widening. This is 
because, as Jan Zielonka reminded us, one cannot study the question of enlargement 
without reference to that of more or less integration, or at least the impact of 
enlargement on the process of integration.50 Now that the EU is negotiating with the 
states of the Western Balkans and Turkey this relationship between widening and 
deepening is back on the political agenda and many of the polarizations familiar from 
the eastern enlargement process have returned to structure conversations about the 
future of Europe. 
 
Looking back it also seems clear that there was nothing inevitable about the outcome 
of negotiations: the 1989 revolutions did not in and of themselves constitute anything 
but a necessary condition – a starting point if you will - for the successful realization 
of the dream of a voluntarily embraced system of intra-European integration. The 
recurring clashes between national interests and the collective interest of ‘Europe’ that 
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characterized the negotiations, both on the ‘inside-outside’ level and amongst insiders, 
brought a familiar element of the existing integration framework into the EU-CEE 
relationship, and represented a good training ground for ‘doing business’ within a 
post-accession context. If indeed the early idealism that flowed from the 1989 
revolutions was diminished rather rapidly by the slow progress on negotiations this 
was counter balanced by Poland, Hungary and other states learning to play the game 
of both inter-state negotiations and supra-state institutional politics. The successful 
adaptation to existing EU modes of decision-making can be demonstrated in the 
smooth functioning of those (enlarged) institutional structures after 2004: those who 
argued that enlargement would lead to chronic institutional failures have been proved 
very wrong. 
 
In the final analysis one should acknowledge the asymmetric nature of this analysis: it 
remains far too early to make judgments about how eastern enlargement has changed 
the European Union and the existing integration process. It is much easier to analyze 
the micro-impact of the EU on Central and Eastern Europe than to offer judgments 
about the European Union that has evolved out of the 1989 revolutions. Rather, the 
chapter focused on the different elements of the enlargement process that quickly took 
shape after 1989 and how each of these elements triggered diverse conversations 
about the nature of the evolving EU. Enlargement may have been completed 
successfully in 2004 and 2007 but the process remains a partial and incomplete one, 
both in the geographic and normative senses. The current Europe-wide academic and 
political preoccupation with democratic deficits of one variety or another, and the 
obvious shortcomings of the EU as a welfare-enhancing entity on the one hand, or 
global geopolitical force on the other, may have led to a failure to properly appreciate 
the nature of the European achievement in consolidating the gains of the ‘1989 
moment’. The EU may be bureaucratically cumbersome and politically enigmatic, but 
in supervising a framework for the renewal of meaningful pan-European inter-state 
cooperation, not to mention the reconstitution of the democratic impulse across the 
continent, it may have contributed in some small way to making 1989 at least as 
important a historical juncture as 1789 and 1848 in the rich tapestry of European 
collective experience. 
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